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Section 5: Paper 10
Forgiveness, Finitude, Apology and Acknowledgment
Mano Daniel
Douglas College
Jim Gough
Athabasca University
Introduction1
To commit wrong and to feel the bitter injustice of wrong-doing is part of the
human predicament. The natural impulse is to pay back the injury in kind. But such
retaliation implicates us in a cycle of resentment, retaliation and revenge. This sort of
retaliation precludes reconciliation. As Michael Ignatieff points out, vengeance
implicates us in the “vicious downward spiral of violence” and in the reinforcement of a
“culture of violence.” All this may be done in the name of honour and respect. 2 The law
is one avenue to rectify such intrusions of wrong-doing. But procedural justice can often
be inadequate. In part, this is because while the law can be broken, literally speaking,
only persons (moral agents) can be wronged. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “The
majesty of the law demands that we be equal—that only our acts count, and not the
person who committed them. The act of forgiving, on the contrary takes the person into
account; no pardon pardons murder or theft but only the murderer or the thief. We always
forgive somebody, never something . . . we forgive for the sake of the person.”3 The
inadequacy of the law is that, while it can offer justice, it is an inadequate mechanism to
deal with the breached failed relationship that occurs because of the wrong. Forgiveness
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offers the promise of reconciliation, or at least, the mending of the relationship rendered
by the wrong.
The ability to offer and receive forgiveness is a hallmark of our humanity. Yet,
this valuable moral resource is both misunderstood and neglected. Forgiveness is a
powerful third way between revenge and forgetting whereby we cope with an injury
inflicted by one upon the other.
We argue for a particular conception of forgiveness with the following
characteristics: forgiveness as transactional (primarily bi-lateral, rather than unilateral),
elective (not obligatory) and conditional. Initiating the process requires forgiveness to be
extended to the wrongdoer but not at the expense of forgetting, excusing, or condoning
the wrong. The offer of the apology shifts the control or power from the wrongdoer to the
victim who may initiate the conditional decision which may culminate in the repairing of
the damaged relationship. A wrong may not be simply a perpetration of harm, but also a
moral insult. It is the insult, this loss of respect for the dignity and integrity of the other,
that needs to be addressed by the apology. The focus of this paper is on the role of
apology; in particular, as it is offered by the perpetrator of the wrong and as it is received
by victim who can, if she chooses, forgive.
II: Profile of the Wrongdoer and the Process of Forgiveness
A profound wrong is inflicted by one upon another. A victim (the sexually
assaulted, the racially recriminated, the betrayed, the genocide survivor, etc.) is created.
When a profound wrong has been perpetrated, the victim will invariably experience anger
and resentment. This resentment may well be justified. Resentment in this sense can be
thought of as moral outrage. Yet, retaliation implicates one in a spiral of revenge. It
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repays injury with another injury.4 In genuine forgiveness, resentment is eliminated, or
seriously ameliorated. The importance of forgiveness is that it can serve to undo the
deeds of the past5, not literally but attitudinally. It enables people to make a new start in
their relations with one another. Forgiveness is the forswearing of justified resentment
engendered by a moral assault and the infliction of a moral insult.6
The role that forgiveness can play in our moral lives is formidable. Yet, it has too
often been diminished. It has been dismissed as a superogatory act that stands at the
periphery of moral obligation, i.e., a favour or gift bestowed by the victim. It has been
denigrated as a form of amateur therapy, misconceived as a kind of forgetting (“time
heals all wounds”); or a type of excuse (“to understand all is to forgive all”). Forgiveness
is best conceived as a transactional process offering the possibility of mending moral
disruptions. It is an important that forgiveness is not a performative; saying is not the
same as doing. The saying of the words “I forgive” does not make it come about.
Forgiveness is not cheap since it requires overcoming, amending, and shifting attitudes, a
process which is arduous and at times insurmountable. This overcoming is a form of
second order existential commitment, a reassertion of sovereignty for one’s identity, and
the reclamation of one’s personal narrative as a person of integrity and worth.
Wrongdoers are significantly affected by forgiveness or its lack. Yet, little
attention has been directed to “what wrongdoers themselves must do in the aftermath of
their wrongful acts.”7 Yet, if forgiveness is to occur, the wrongdoer has to offer a genuine
act of contrition – a sincere avowal of the wrongdoer’s culpability. Two presumptions,
while contestable, are warranted although not defended here: first, we adopt the position
that forgiveness is a discretionary judgment; it is an elective, though not mandatory,
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prerogative of the victim. Some accounts of forgiveness argue there are instances where
offering forgiveness is obligatory.8 We think this account is mistaken since it
misconstrues the sense of voluntary agency if one is required to forgive.9 Second, while
forgiveness can be considered a uni-lateral decision by the victim to forgive, we adopt bilateral forgiveness as paradigmatic since it preserves and makes explicit two perspectives,
of victim and wrongdoer. Forgiveness may be self-directed but it is usually otherdirected. It is another person who is the target of this moral and affective relation.
Conceived as a bi-lateral transactional process from the perspective of the perpetrator,
forgiveness occurs when one person injures another, atones, begs forgiveness, and it is
granted. Radzik claims that “to right a wrong is to restore the social imbalance, to bring
the relationship or the community back into harmony.”10 This harmonization requires that
both parties affected by the offence achieve parity. Put differently, the power differential
which is knocked off kilter by the offence is restored, both at an interpersonal and
communal level.11
The process of forgiving has a dialectical structure with three moments: One, a
wrong or injury is perpetrated by one person against another. Two, the onus is on the
injurer to offer restitution or an apology which acknowledges responsibility for the moral
insult, express (tacitly or explicitly) remorse, offer assurance about future conduct, and
entreat the victim for forgiveness. Three, the victim forgives the perpetrator; the original
act is neither cancelled nor nullified but repaired to facilitate a possible reconciliation.
In order for the forgiver to be in a position to carry through the act of forgiveness,
she must undergo a number of cognitive and attitudinal shifts:
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An emotional shift: the affective overcoming of negative feelings– be they anger,
resentment, or even moral hate towards the perpetrator. In releasing these
negative feelings, the victim need not renounce her belief that a wrong was
perpetrated against her; she neither condones nor excuses the act.

A temporal shift: the temporal placing of the wrong in the past so that the future
will not be preoccupied or remain burdened by it. Govier asserts that one must
“let past wrongs remain in the past, freeing one’s present and future from a
troubled preoccupation with the past.”12
A structural shift: a reframing of the situation in which the perpetrator is
separated from the wrong; a prising apart of the sinner from the sin, so to speak.
One way of doing this is to isolate the offending deed from the totality of the
perpetrator’s biography.
A narrative shift: an act of self-renewal, in which the victim transcends the event
by not letting the event stunt or define both victim and perpetrator. The victim
regains control over her life. Since our biographies are both lived and told, the
significance we ascribe to our actions is open to reinterpretation so we can
reinvent our past to provide a transformative life-story or narrative.13
A cathartic shift: the releasing of a moral claim against the perpetrator; the moral
debt is discharged; the resentment is purged.
Reconciliation—the rebuilding or repairing of the broken relationship – between
victim and perpetrator is conspicuously absent from the above. While we agree with
Roberts that the goal or “teleology of forgiveness is reconciliation,”14 it is a mistake to
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hold that if reconciliation does not take place, then forgiveness has not occurred. The
parents of a murdered child may come to forgive the murderer, release their anger and
resentment for the arbitrary and abrupt removal of their child from their lives, but it
makes no sense to say that their forgiveness is incomplete if they choose not to build and
conduct a relationship with the murderer. To forgive is to mend what has been torn.
While reconciliation is an aspiration, often a rewarding realisable possibility, it is not a
necessary component for forgiveness.
Granting forgiveness, the offence is not forgotten or condoned. Rather it will be
remembered in a way that is compatible with peaceful co-existence. It is a coming to
terms with the past so the future can be lived unfettered by resentment. Forgiving is
typically not a uni-lateral judgment. One must have good reasons to forgive, and, usually
the wrongdoer has a critical part to play in the construction of these good reasons. The
wrongdoer has to acknowledge atonement.
III: Apology, Atonement and the Role of Acknowledgement
Atonement on the part of the perpetrator is an important step in the process of
forgiveness functioning both as an expression of sorrow for the wrongdoing and as an
initiative towards reconciliation. Following Radzik, the process of atonement is “a matter
of reconciling the parties to one another and to themselves as equally valuable moral
persons”15 and is what “the wrongdoer must do in order to respond in a morally proper
way to her wrongful act.”16 Atonement often involves both apology and
acknowledgement. Acknowledgment opens the possibility of atonement for the wrong,
giving voice in the apology. Failure to atone for one’s wrongdoing often compounds the
original wrong and could negate the apology.
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Atonement is making moral amends. As Radzik argues, through the infliction of
the wrong, the perpetrator is denigrating the victim as a person of little or no moral worth.
An apology leaves this message of moral worthlessness unsaid. It is considered an
attempt to cancel this insulting, humiliating message that can end the anger and
resentment of the victim. “To wrong another person is to insult and threaten him. To do
nothing (or to fail to do enough) to correct that action is to allow the insult and threat to
stand. It is to condone their continued influence. When one fails to atone, one suggests
that one still views the victim as inferior and that one remains a threat to him.”17
An apology is not a soliloquy. It occurs when the offender acknowledges
responsibility for an injury or grievance and expresses regret and remorse to the
aggrieved.18 No apology is successful without communication between offender and
victim. As Tavuchis notes, the apology “cannot be delegated, consigned, exacted, or
assumed by the principals, no less outsiders, without totally altering its meaning and
vitiating its moral force.”19 By recapitulating the wrong and seeking forgiveness, the
apologiser voluntarily adopts a posture of vulnerability, openness, honesty and accedes to
the victim(s) the power to accept, refuse or ignore the apology and in turn to forgive or
refuse to forgive. In a sincere apology, the apologiser voluntarily declares he has no
excuse (mitigating or exculpatory), justification, or explanation for his transgression and
accepts full responsibility.
The authentic apology is a speech act seeking atonement by acknowledging
responsibility and guilt. The wrongdoer acknowledges inflicting injury and harm,
acknowledges the restoration of the moral dignity of the undeserving, ill-treated victim(s)
that was unfairly and unjustly ignored, and acknowledges the legitimacy of resentment
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harboured by the wronged.20 When he has successfully atoned for his transgression, he
gives his victim good reasons to stop harbouring resentment. The apology is directed at
the victim, not solely to the act. One type of insincere apology occurs when what is
apologized for is the wrong, but no apology is addressed to the victim of the wrong. For
example, “I am sorry that that you were offended by my action, which I admit, was illadvised.” Apologies are a powerful way to acknowledge responsibility and guilt, and to
express other-oriented moral regret. Yet, as Govier and Verwoerd write, “Much more
needs to be said about acknowledgement, which is a greatly underexplored concept. An
account of why acknowledgement is important to human beings may be grounded in
theories about the social construction of identities, roles, and values.”21
Acknowledgment is to bear witness, to attest. An apology contains within itself a
two- tiered structure of acknowledgement. One sense of the term “acknowledgment” is
descriptive. I accept that I was the material cause for the harm and I now feel remorse for
harming you. Moreover, I appreciate the meaning of my role in the context of the harm.
But there is a second sort of acknowledgement, a second order, existential aspect that
involves the vocabulary of such terms as responsibility, ownership, and commitment. It is
only with the accomplishment of this second order directive that one can be said to be
taking charge of one’s life and of one’s self transformation. Here is the insight to the
transformation that is necessary to atonement. The descriptive response requires an
acceptance of the act, a deeper understanding of one’s role and behaviour. The existential
response is to take personal and moral responsibility for oneself as a member of a moral
community by an act of attestation. This commitment is a will to will oneself fully
responsible through the existential act of personal acknowledgement. Acts of
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acknowledgement infuse moral significance; they situate the victim, perpetrator and
wrong within a moral horizon.
There are, of course, reasons why someone might fail to forgive despite the offer
of an apology. For example, the act of forgiving might make the victim feel enfeebled
rather than empowered. In such a situation, forgiveness would simply exacerbate victim
humiliation since it would admit that the perpetrator continues to hold

undeserved

power, authority, or strength. But one may also refuse to forgive if the offence is of such
a nature as to be completely and absolutely unforgivable.
There are indeed some acts that are unforgivable, like the atrocities committed on the
serial killer Robert Pickton’s farm--acts so horrendous “that they transcend the realm of
human affairs and the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically destroy
wherever they make their appearance.”22 Nevertheless since the perpetrators are
autonomous moral agents with the capacity for reflection and transformation, no person
is absolutely unforgivable. By distinguishing between agent and deed and between
absolute and conditional forgiveness, “[we] may rightly regard a perpetrator as
conditionally unforgivable if that perpetrator has not acknowledged, and does not morally
regret, the wrongdoing.”23 If the perpetrator remains wedded to the unforgivability of the
act and has not convincingly separated himself from the deed, then there may be good
reasons to hold him conditionally unforgivable.24 The lack, or inadequacy, of the apology
is sufficient to deem him an unworthy recipient of forgiveness.
The apology can meet certain needs of the victim. It can contribute to the
restoration of her self-worth and dignity, re-establish her self-respect, provide assurance
to the victim that fault does not lie with her, provide assurance that both parties have
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shared values and can co-exist in the moral community as co-equals, confirm that the
insult has been “unsaid” but is now recognized and given voice, and establish that the
sense of threat is replaced by that of safety. Through the apology, the perpetrator allows
for the possibility of a meaningful dialogue that may repair the damaged relationship
between victim and wrongdoer and the relationship between the wrongdoer and
community.
IV: A Consideration of Two Apologies
What then must the perpetrator do if he is to be a recipient of forgiveness? A
precondition is a sufficient period of time for self-reflection and self-appraisal. If
atonement is to be achieved, the following are steps to be taken to render continued
resentment and anger inappropriate:
A. There is, initially, a cognitive acknowledgement of responsibility for having
perpetrated the wrong. The perpetrator who does not own up to the wrong would
feel no need to be forgiven. If he did not do anything wrong, then he would not
feel guilty and any attempt to forgive would be felt to be misplaced. By accepting
his guilt, he may wish to unburden himself of it. The example of Speer and
Spitzer’s apologies will be considered below in response to this condition.
B. There is an authentic emotional feeling of remorse. This involves recognition of
guilt that will saddle the perpetrator with negative feelings such as shame and
remorse. This feeling of remorse can find expression through the sense of moral
regret which is the acknowledgment of responsibility. This guilt is not selfnegating, all consuming, but the trigger for a positive change in the perpetrator.
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C. There is repudiation in deed and word of oneself as the wrongdoer, a commitment
to become the sort of person that will refrain from such deeds. Repentance alone,
however, is insufficient since it is often a unilateral act. To vow not to act in such
a way again does nothing to repair the social rupture that the wrong has wrought
unless it is followed by a sincere commitment to change.25
D. There is a genuine narrative accounting for how one came to do the wrong, how
the wrong-doing does not express the totality of one’s biography, and how one
has changed for the better. The Eric Lomax case will be employed later to track
this consideration.
E. The expression or reaffirmation that both the wrongdoer and the victim are
members of the moral community with the attendant dignity and moral worthiness
that such membership entails. The apology is a testament by the wrongdoer of the
salience of moral norms since it is an admission of a violation of these norms. As
Deigh maintains, “social cohesion in a community depends on its members
sharing an understanding of what each owes the others, both individually and
collectively, in the way of forbearances and positive services.”26
When a comprehensive apology is wholeheartedly delivered, and received as such
by the wronged person, the initiative to forgive is placed on the shoulders of the victim.
However, the apology can also be inadequate. A necessary component of any apology is
that it must restore the sense of worth, dignity, personal power or authority of the
offended party. There are disavowals that fail to be apologies. Here are three types of
diversions.
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First, an apology is not an explanation. An explanation helps us to understand
how something occurred--the cause and effect relationship between the antecedents to the
act and the act itself. But this does not tell us morally why something was done or what
values are involved in the process of intention to act or of the consequences, intended or
otherwise, that subsequently occur. For example, the police may explain why they failed
to apprehend the serial murderer before he committed his last murder, given all the
evidence that was available to them, but this account is not a justification and not the
basis for an apology.
Second, an apology is not an excuse. An excuse is an attempt to provide an
account of what happened as happening beyond the agent’s control; it is the attempt to
exculpate the agent responsibility while recognising the action as wrong. While in a
mitigating excuse the responsibility is partially lifted, in an exculpatory excuse the
agent’s responsibility is fully eliminated. But if the agent is not responsible, it is hard to
see what she is being forgiven for. For example, when a mining company executive is
caught bribing a corrupt industry minister in a foreign country, the claim that such
practices are accepted in “their country” is an excuse in a failed attempt to justify a
wrong. In this case, an excuse masquerades as a justification but fails to provide adequate
ethical grounds to accept the account. It is an attempt to gain ethically unjustified-perhaps expediency-based--acceptance for a wrong. Third, an apology is not a statement
of regret since it does not link remorse with contrition. One can regret errors of omission
or mistakes of understanding without acknowledging that one should have done things
differently. This is to regret that the world could have been otherwise and the conditions
for the wrongful choice might not have occurred, but such personal remorse is not an
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apology. Instead it focuses on the self-serving feelings of the perpetrator and not the
victim. Unlike an excuse, an explanation, or a statement of regret, an apology minimally
involves recognizing, acknowledging, and taking personal responsibility for the act and
trying to repair the damage done by it. Here are some initial criteria for detecting a
genuine apology:

1. It is sincere, authentic or self-authored by the person giving the apology. The mother
apologizing for the actions of her grown son, without the express permission of the son,
may be an example of an insincere apology by proxy.
2. There is an adequate acknowledge of wrongdoing in which the offender accounts for
his actions with an appropriate degree of specificity. Someone making the sweeping
claim to apologize to anyone he may have offended in the past in his role as
administrator, may be woefully inadequate. Not only is such a sweeping claim vague but
it is also inadequate because its generalization fails to identify specifics.
3. There is an acceptance of blame. Specifically he makes clear why his actions were
wrong and identifies the principles he violated. Often someone will apologize but still not
accept blame for what he has done. For example, the individual may apologize for
participating in the process of the mistreatment of others but shift the blame to what is
called “situational control”, i.e., one’s prescribed role in that situation and duties
attendant in the context. The community exerts such social control that it is deemed
impossible to escape it and so one is not responsible for the subsequent actions that
conform to this control. This is a form of relativism that seems to obscure the individual’s
responsibility for his part in a situation. Many of the defendants at the Nuremberg trial
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took this stance. Their plea was “not guilty” on the basis of the fact that they were just
doing what they were told – what the law at the time promoted – in a kind of transference
to the other away from the individual’s responsibility to the individual’s situation.
4. There is adequate evidence that a transformative process has already begun--that there
is evidence of a commitment to change ethical character and disposition. Such evidence,
Deigh suggests, may be evinced by the development of a “conscience, which both works
to restrain him from yielding to those narrow interests, emotions, and impulses that, if
acted on, would harm others, and moves him to reparative action when he has violated
one of its strictures and consequently damaged or risked damaging harmonious relations
he has with others.”27
The Lomax Case: A Successful Apology
A prisoner of war during World War II, Eric Lomax, in his memoir28, writes of
being consumed by hatred and vengeance until he received an apology nearly fifty years
later and was able to forgive his torturer tormenter. His account is that of a man trying to
make sense of his experiences. He was suspected of spying and subjected to brutal
interrogation and torture, caged in a cell, land left exposed in the sun for extended periods
of time. His torturer and interpreter was a brutal man who became the focus of his hatred.
Though constantly threatened with death, he was eventually sent to a Singapore prison.
Upon his return to Scotland, his life had been dramatically altered by his experiences in
Burma as he suffered emotional withdrawal and was prone to icy rages and silent
hostility. He frequently fantasized about the revenge he would exact from the interpreter.
He read about a Japanese translator wracked with forty years of guilt for inflicting cruelty
on POWs. The translator mentioned his inability to forget a victim tortured for drawing
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and hiding a map. Lomax recognised Nagase Takashi, his torturer. The article described
Takashi’s repentance and his attempts at atonement which included setting up a
charitable foundation for survivors of the Asian labourers, the laying of wreaths at the
Allied cemetery, and his frequent trips to Thailand to build a temple at the bridge over the
River Kwai. Later Lomax read about the shame that Takashi felt while watching Lomax
being beaten. Takashi, now a Buddhist, wrote of being forgiven after praying at a
cemetery for Allied soldiers. Lomax met Takashi, noting that Takashi’s remorse was
acute. Takashi said his life had been profoundly altered because of the War and he was
now opposed to militarism. The two met and Lomax gave Takashi a letter of forgiveness.
Since we are interested in the phenomenon of apology from the perspective of the
perpetrator, our interest is more on the torturer Takashi than Lomax the prisoner. With
this focus, the following significant steps were taken by Takashi to demonstrate an
attempted atonement:


He wrote a short book reflecting upon his experiences ((A): a cognitive
acknowledgement)



He felt guilt and remorse (B)



He worked with the War Graves Commission and revisited the graves (C)



He built a religious shrine at one end of the bridge over the River Kwai (E)



He adopted an anti-militarist position (C)



When contacted by Lomax’s wife and informed of her husband’s anguish, he
acknowledged who he was and responded with a thoughtful, sincere letter (E)



When the two met, Takashi kept repeating “I am very, very sorry.” (B)
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Takashi gave Lomax enough good reasons to demonstrate that he had atoned for
his transgressions and that it was time to mend the rupture. Takashi’s response to the
wrongs that he had committed is significantly different from that provided by other
offenders, like Governor Eliot Spitzer so it will be useful to contrast these two examples.

The Spitzer Case: A Failed Apology
In March 2008, Elliot Spitzer, the Governor of New York, stepped down from his
office because he had been implicated for patronising high priced prostitutes. He offered
what was supposed to be an apology. It was painfully inadequate but instructive.
First, he did not come clean. No details of his wrongdoings were revealed; he
evaded rather than acknowledged responsibility (A). He began his public address with an
account of his accomplishments as State Governor General and Attorney General which,
in fallacious Red Herring fashion, diverted attention away from the wrong and his part in
it.
Second, his framing of his resignation as a private, personal failing or private
matter seemed calculated to remove it from public scrutiny. He spun the prostitutionrelated offence as an affair and not a crime; hence he focused on the hurt to his family,
not his failed relationship with the society that elected him. It seemed contrived, an
attempt to negotiate himself into a position to avoid criminal charges. There was no
evidence of contrition, no semblance of emotional feeling or remorse. He stood steadfast
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and resolute. While Spitzer used emotional modifiers in his brief televised statement,
such as he felt “deeply sorry” and “sincerely apologized,” both his body language of
detachment and his wife’s body language of disbelief seemed to open these statements to
serious doubt.
Third, his statements contained no repudiation of himself as the wrongdoer (C).
His avowal that he had “disappointed himself” did nothing to inform his audience as to
what moral values he had violated. This was a statement of regret for the consequences
he would suffer, not a genuine apology intended to change relationships.
Fourth, he provided no narrative accounting, in which he situated himself as the
main actor, for how he came to do the wrong (D) or how he intended to change because
of it. There was little attempt to provide a cogent self-narrative explaining motive or
context; the audience was afforded no insight into his character or the nature of his
offences.
Fifth, there was little attempt to reaffirm his membership in and relational
commitment to the moral community (E). He did affirm that he would attempt “to regain
the trust of his family and friends” but the offences were clearly more egregious and he
said nothing about the damage to the moral community or how he would address or
rectify them.
V: Conclusion
When a wrong occurs, there is a need for a moral transaction to be negotiated, a
damaged relationship to be repaired and a resolution made to rectify the wrong. Human
beings are finite and incomplete and so is the public realm in which we act. Relationships
that are fractured by a wrong cannot await a judicial decision or the expectation of a
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correction of the fault in another world. Both the victim and the perpetrator need to have
good reasons to work toward a resolution of a wrong. The acknowledgement of one’s
culpability in a wrong reveals an important insight about forgiveness – that we are
fallible, limited beings. As Berel Lang claims, “the acknowledgement of a wrong
committed and the assurance he [the wrongdoer] offers against its recurrence also
represent a confession of limitation: he has not only suffered finitude, he has also asserted
it, an acknowledgement that represents a stronger form of self-knowledge.”29
Forgiveness by the victim opens the door to acknowledgement, to atonement for
the wrong by the perpetrator, often in the form of an apology, and, finally, in the
completion of the process, to the possibility of reconciliation. This transformation of the
perpetrator and the victim in their relationship to each other is essential to achieving the
recognition that can benefit both the perpetrator and the victim, abandoning
recrimination, resentment, and hatred, and thereby freeing both parties.
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